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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH J 
Plaintiff' ~ Respondent, 
I 
vs. ' Case No. 
CARL ARCHIE ANDRE\V, and )' 
KENNETH ERVIN, 
Defendants ._~ Appellants. : 
11158 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
THE INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, UTAH AFFILIATE AS 
AMICUS CURIAE 
The Utah Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties 
Union is an association dedicated to the preservation 
of constitutional rights and liberties. 'Ve believe that 
the rights of all citizens are threatened when the rights 
of any citizen are denied. 'Ve believe that there is no 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
greater challenge to the liberty and security of free 
citizens than occurs when a miscarriage of justice re-
sults in the conviction of men very probably innocent. 
'Ve urge upon this Court that the present case is such 
a case, one in which the appellants, though very prob-
ably innocent, have been convicted by reason of errors 
of law and denials of constitutional rights which occur-
red in the proceedings below. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE AND 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Your Amicus concurs with the Statement of the 
Case and Statement of Disposition below contained on 
pages I to 3 of the Appellants' Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
'Ve request this Court to reverse the conviction 
and remand the case for a new trial. We further request 
that the Court order the exclusion of eye witness identi-
fication evidence o.btained in violation of defendants' 
rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shortly after 6 :00 p.m. on June 26, 1967 (Tr. 60), 
Mrs. Gaydra Jackman was severely beaten over the 
2 
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head with a pistol and robbed of seven dollars and a 
watch by a stranger who entered her home in Juab 
County, about four blocks from Highway 91 and some 
five miles from Nephi, Utah (Tr. 32}. The intruder 
was accompanied by another man who was outside the 
Jackman house for most of the time during the course 
of the incident. Both of these men were described by 
Mrs. Jackman as Negroes. 
On June 29, 1967, the defendants Carl Andrew 
and Kenneth Ervin were arrested in Rawlins 'VYo-' . 
ming and brought to Utah on July 1, 1967. The basis 
for the arrest was that defendants were Negroes some-
what resembling the description given by Mrs. Jack-
man and they had passed through Juab County on 
Highway 91 on the afternoon of June 26th, accom-
panied by Kenneth Ervin's mother and his nine year 
old brother. The sheriff's department had learned of 
their presence in the county from a service station op-
erator in Levan, Utah. Indeed, Kenneth Ervin had left 
his name and his mother's address in Rawlins with the 
service station operator because Kenneth had rented 
a tow chain to use in towing his disabled car to Rawlins. 
Kenneth left his name, Rawlins address, and a cash 
deposit, intending to return the chain and recover his 
deposit on his return trip to Los Angeles (Tr. 167-
168). A witness testified that two other men driving 
an old car came into her parents' restaurant in Levan 
at about 3 :00 p.m. on June 26th. The witness described 
one man as dark, medium height and slender, "more 
Mexican than Negro," and wearing a charcoal and 
3 
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white jacket (Tr. 201). The witness also described 
this man as "sarcastic" (Tr. 198) and testified that 
they drove north toward Nephi (Tr. 199) . The wit-
ness further testified that the defendants were not these 
men (Tr. 199). Except for the fact that the witness 
described the man as more l\1exican than Negro her 
description of that man basically matched the victim's 
description of her assailant. 
Defendant Carl Andrew is employed as a gravel-
crusher in Rawlins. Defendant Kenneth Ervin is a 26-
year old computer operator employed in Los Angeles 
(Tr. 160). On June 25, 1967, Ervin left Los Angeles 
by car on a two-week vacation to visit his mother in 
Rawlins (Tr. 161). His car broke down in Levan, 
Utah (Tr. 165) . Upon learning that his car needed 
major repairs (Tr. 91), he called his mother and told 
her of his predicament (Tr. 166). Mrs. Ervin arranged 
to drive to Levan, accompanied by her nine year old 
son and by Carl Andrew, a neighbor and friend, to 
pick up Kenneth and tow his disabled car to Rawlins. 
They arrived at Levan at approximately noon on June 
2t6h (Tr. 231). Ervin and Andrew disconnected the 
drive shaft on Ervin's car (Tr. 167) , and chained Er-
vin's car to the back of Mrs. Ervin's car with the rented 
chain. They then left Levan at about 1 :45 or 2 :00 p.m. 
(Tr. 220, 168), stopping in Nephi for some hamburgers 
(Tr. 169) , and making several other stops, near Mona, 
north of Provo, in a gas station in Salt Lake County, 
and at the Last Chance Cafe in Parley's Canyon. Two 
disinterested witnesses placed defendants in Salt Lake 
4 
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County between 5 :00 and 6 :00 p.m. A fourteen year 
old boy testified that the two chained cars drove into his 
father's gas station at "106 South State Street, Salt 
Lake County" (Tr. 181), at, he guessed, about 5:00 
p.m. (Tr. 182). On cross-examination, he admitted he 
was not sure about the time and it could have been as 
late as 9 :00 p.m. But another witness, the co-owner of 
the Last Chance Cafe, located in Parley's Canyon east 
of Salt Lake City, was positive the defendants stopped 
at his place around 5:30 and certainly no later than 
6 :00 p.m. (Tr. 190, 193-4). This would have made it 
virtually impossible for defendants to have been at 
the Jackman home at the time the crime was committed. 
The defendants testified in their own behalf and 
denied any connection with the assault on Mrs. Jack-
man. Ervin's mother and nine year old brother also 
denied the defendants committed the crime. The de-
fense sought to introduce evidence of the good character 
and good reputation of the defendants through a 
neighbor who attended church with the Ervin family 
and knew both Kenneth Ervin and Carl Andrew well 
and knew their reputation in the community, but the 
trial court limited such testimony to reputation for 
veracity. The testimony of Andrew's employer was 
also limited to reputation for veracity (Tr. 213, 214, 
217). 
The prosecution's case turned almost exclusively 
on the victim's in-court identification. There were no 
fingerprints, and no real or scientific evidence. Yet 
5 
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the victim admitted that she had never before seen a 
Negro close up (Tr. 69), and did not have her glasses 
on at the time and without her glasses she had difficulty 
seeing things more than four feet away (Tr. 70). The 
only corroboration of the victim's identification was the 
notably weak testimony of Don Hatch Warner, a wit-
ness who drove by the Jackman house at about 4 :45 
p.m. (Tr. 127), and noticed as he passed, a car with 
a white back (Tr. 134), parked in the yard. (.Mrs. 
Ervin's car is two-tone, red and white.) This witness 
also testified that he saw a tall Negro in the yard, but 
could not see his face (Tr. 135). Nevertheless, he identi-
fied Andrew as the man he saw because the man walked 
slowly (Tr. 129), the way he saw Andrew walk in 
court (Tr. 130) . The witness admitted he could not 
be positive in his identification (Tr. 135). Significantly, 
the witness testified to seeing only one car in the Jack-
man yard (Tr. 131 ) and further testified that he did 
not see another parked car on his way back to Nephi 
(Tr. 132). Since it is clear that Ervin's car was in-
operative, the failure to account for that car is another 
significant gap in the prosecution theory. 
The victim testified that she saw defendants in a 
lineup at the state prison conducted on July 5, 1967. 
She admitted to having some difficulty in identifying 
defendant Ervin at the lineup. She had difficulty identi-
fying Ervin at the lineup even though the two defend-
ants were the only men in the lineup matching the 
description she had given of the men who had entered 
her home (Tr. 63, 64, 66, {:i8) . Indeed, of the other four 
6 
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men in the lineup, two were not even Negroes and each 
of the other two Negroes had such distinctive features 
that they could be eliminated for that reason. One of 
the other Negroes was totally, even strikingly bald. The 
other man was stocky (Tr. 67) and had a noticeablv 
flattened nose which the witness could recall at triai, 
two months later (Tr. 66). 
The defendants were not advised of their right 
to have counsel present at the lineup and no counsel 
for defendants was present (Hearing on Motion for 
New Trial P. 7) . Though the victim's trial testimony 
gives the impression that she did actually identfy both 
defendants at the lineup, the statement of the county 
attorney shows she was not able to make a positive 
identification of defendant Ervin immediately after 
the lineup. By reason of the denial of counsel at the 
lineup, the witness' failure to identify Ervin at the 
lineup was not known to the defense until after the 
trial was over. 
On August 15, 1967, the day defendants were 
arraigned on the information, the district attorney took 
a sworn deposition from Gaydra Jackman, under oath, 
without notice to defendants or their attorney. This 
deposition was conducted in the courtroom itself by 
the district attorney as if it were part of the formal 
proceedings. By leading, repetitive and suggestiYe 
questions concerning the witness' certainty as to the 
identity of the defendants, the district attorney tended 
to suggest and fix the witness' testimony, in violation 
7 
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of the defendants' right to be present at a deposition 
and their basic right of confrontation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ERRORS AND IMPROPRIETIES 
COMMITTED BELOW ADD UP TO A GROSS 
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE SINCE THE 
RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS ARE VERY PROBABLY INNO-
CENT. 
A. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE 
VERY PROBABLY INNOCENT. 
The prosecution theory of the case requires one to 
accept the hypothesis that a young man with an un-
blemished record and a responsible well-paying job 
would leave his mother and nine year old brother sitting 
out in a car ,on the road or in a stranger's yard while 
he entered the home of a stranger and committed an 
assault and robbery on a young mother. Against this 
theory of the case are the facts that Ervin has a com-
pletely unblemished record and Andrew has only a 
conviction for writing a bad check back in the 1930' s; 
no gun or other weapon was found in a search of de-
fendant's possessions, the stolen watch was not found; 
no fingerprints or other scientific or real evidence con-
nect the defendants with the crime, they have always 
8 
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and repeatedly denied any guilt including by testimonv 
at trial, a disinterested witness testified to seeing d;-
f endants with the two cars chained together at his sen-
ice station in Salt Lake County at a time when it would 
have been virtually impossible for them to have been 
there if they had committed the crime, and both Ervin's 
mother and Ervin's young brother deny defendants' 
guilt. Further, despite the victim's positive identification 
of defendants at trial, the affidavit of the county attor-
ney shows that she had initial difficulty in recognizing 
defendant Ervin at the lineup shortly after the crime 
when her recollection was freshest and less subject to 
suggestion. Given these facts, it should be perfectly 
clear that this case is no run of the mill robbery and 
assault conviction. Yet despite the weakness of the 
prosecution case and the strong showing of the inno-
cence of defendants, the jury brought in a verdict of 
guilty for both defendants after only 45 minutes of 
deliberation. 
'Ve will show that this verdict was a direct result 
of numerous and significant errors, some of constitu-
tional dimensions and all extremely prejudicial. 
B. THE ERRORS AND IMPROPRIETIES 
BELU\V CUMULATIVELY DEMON-
STRATE THAT THIS CONVICTION 
IS A GROSS MISCARRIAGE OF JUS-
TICE. 
The errors below kept the jury from hearing pro-
ba tivc evidence of the good character of the defendants 
9 
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and rendered unreliable the key prosecution evidence, 
the in-court identification of the defendants by the vic-
tim. Errors below also tainted and rendered unreliable 
the only real corroborative evidence, the testimony of 
the witness, Dan Hatch Warner. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJ-
UDICIAL ERROR BY EXCLUDING EVI-
DENCE OF THE GOOD CHARACTER AND 
GOOD REPUTATION OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS. THIS ERROR REQUIRES REVERSAL 
OF THE CONVICTION IN AND OF ITSELF. 
The law is clear and well settled that defendants 
in a criminal case may introduce evidence of law abid-
ing character and good reputation on the substantive 
question of guilt or innocence. The rule is stated clearly 
and simply in American Jurisprudence Second, 29 Am. 
J ur. 2d § 388, and in Corpus Juris Secundum, 22A 
C.J.S. § 676, and these treatises cite scores of cases 
for the proposition but there is probably no better state-
ment of the rule than that of this court in State v. Blue, 
17 Utah 175, 53 P. 978 (1898). Mr. Justice Bartch, 
speaking for the unanimous court, stated at 17 Utah 
183: 
"The law is well settled, at least by the weight 
of recent authority, that in every criminal case 
the defendant is entitled to prove his good charac· 
ter. vVhere one is charged with an offense, such 
evidence is admissible, regardless of the decisiYe 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or i~d~cisi~e character of the other testimony; 
~nd it is ":'1thin. the. province of the jury to give 
it such weight, m view of all the other evidence 
as it may be entitled to receive. When a pers01~ 
is charged with the commission of an act which 
is wholly inconsistent with his former conduct 
and uniform course of life, justice demands that 
in this extreme moment of his existence, whe~ 
he is about to be deprived of life or liberty, re-
duced to shame and disgrace, he be permitted to 
show the important fact of his good character. 
Such fact, considered in connection with the 
criminating facts, may of itself be sufficient to 
render it highly improbable that the accused 
would commit the crime charged, and raise a 
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury . . . 
History and experience teach us that there are 
cases in which the accused's sole defense is a 
good character, and yet this may outweigh the 
most positive proof." (Emphasis added.) 
While another Utah case has considered the ap-
propriateness of evidence of general good character to 
a charge of a crime involving a particular kind of 
wrongdoing, State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 P. 
161 ( 1921), it is clear that under the rule of State v. 
Blue and the well settled rule of law, that general good 
character was relevant to disprove guilt of the infamous 
and atrocious crimes of which the defendants Ervin 
and Andrew was accused. State v. Van Kuran, 25 Utah 
8, 69 P.60 (1902). See also State v. Peterson, 110 
Utah 413, 174 P. 2d 843 (1946), State v. Barretta, 
47 Utah 479, 155 P. 343 (1916), State v. Brown, 39 
Utah 140, 115 P. 994 (1911). 
11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Despite the clearly established rule, the trial court 
erroneously limited the testimony of character and repu-
tation to reputation for truthfulness and veracity. When 
a defense witness, a neighbor who attended church with 
the defendants, was asked, if she knew the reputation 
of the defendants in the community, the trial judge 
specifically stated to defense counsel at page 214 of 
the transcript: 
"The only question to which you may ask is 
to the truthfulness and veracity. You may first 
inquire as to whether or not the witness knows 
the general reputation in the community in which 
they live for truthfulness. If she answers that 
question yes ,then you may ask what that rep-
utation is . . . " 
By reason of this ruling of the court, the neighbor 
who knew defendants Ervin and Andrew socially and 
testified she attended church with them was only per-
mitted to be asked about defendants' reputation for 
truthfulness and defendant Andrew's employer, who 
had employed him for about six years and had known 
him for twelve years, was similarly limited in his testi-
mony to Andrew's reputation for truthfulness. When 
the witness was asked, "'Vhat type of employee has 
he been," the witness was not allowed to answer because 
the c.ourt ruled it to be "irrelevant and immaterial." 
Clearly, these rulings were error. 
Given the posture of this case, in which defendants 
were being tried for a brutal and infamous crime in a 
community in which they were strangers from out of 
12 
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state, their good character and good reputation were 
matters vital to their defense. Indeed, good reputation 
and alibi are the only defenses available to counter a 
criminal charge premised upon a mistaken eye-witness 
identification. Defendants sought to make both these 
defenses as well as showing the inappropriateness of 
the identification. If the jury had been permitted to 
hear and consider the evidence of good character and 
good reputation they could not have failed to be influ-
enced in their verdict. Thus for this reason itself, inde-
pendent of all the other errors committed below, justic~ 
requires that this court reverse the conviction and re-
mand the case for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE KEY PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS BY THE VICTIM, GAYDRA JACK-
MAN, WAS HIGHLY UNRELIABLE IN IT-
SELF AND BY REASON OF THE IMPROPER 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 'VHICH 
OCCURRED PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
As a matter of legal science it is now generally 
recognized that eye-witness identification by a single 
witness is extremely weak and unreliable evidence. 
Many commentators and Judges have noted that eye-
witness identification, however certain the witness may 
be, tends to be extremely unreliable. A recent and ex-
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haustive work, Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in 
Criminal Cases, ( 1965), notes that the likelihood of 
error is greater when the identification is made by a 
single witness, at page 11; and where the witness is 
identifying persons of a different race, at page 122. 
Justice Frankfurter, while a professor at Harvard, 
wrote that: 
"The identification of strangers is proverbially 
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony 
are established by a formidable number of in-
stances in the records of English and American 
Trials." 
Frankfurter, The case of Sacco and Vanzetti 
30 (1927). 
Judge Jerome Frank stated that: 
" ... perhaps erroneous identification of the 
accused constitutes the major cause of the known 
wrongful convictions." 
Frank & Frank, Not Guilty, 61 (1957) 
Professor Borchard in his classic work, Convicting 
the Innocent, (1932) stated at page 111: 
"Perhaps the major source of these tragic 
errors is an identification of the accused by the 
victim of a crime of violence." 
A similar statement was made by a leading American 
prosecutor, Richard Kuh, formerly Chief Assistant 
Prosecutor in the New York County District Attor-
ney's Office. According to Mr. Kuh: 
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"Proof that relies wholly on identifications 
made by eye-witness (is) . inherently weak, per-
sons who merely. ~aw a thief or attacker briefly, 
and und~r conditions of stress may despite the 
best of znten.tions-too readily be mistaken." 
Kuh, Careers in Prosecution Offices, 14 Journal 
of Legal Education 175, 187 (1961). (Empha-
sis added.) 
Similarly, the Lord Chief Justice of England in a 
1961 case, Regina v. Parks, (1961} 1 W.L.R. 1484, 
1485, felt called upon to say: 
"It is well known that these questions of identi-
fication are difficult. They can lead to a miscar-
riage of Justice and the court though with great 
hesitation has come to the conclusion that it 
would be unsafe to allow this conviction to stand." 
Indeed, this honorable Court has only recently had occa-
sion to consider the unreliability of eye-witness identi-
fications. In State v. Reeves, .... Utah 2d .... , .... P. 2d 
.... , filed March 25, 1968, Justice Henriod noted for 
a unanimous court that two witnesses to the crime 
identified some one other than the defendant at a lineup. 
Yet the court ruled that "the faulty inconsistent evi-
dence of identification by two witnesses," did not create 
a reasonable doubt as a matter of law when contrasted 
with other direct and circumstantial evidence. Fortu-
nately for the innocent man so identified in the Reeves 
lineup, there were other evidence and other witnesses 
and the lineup was not the basis upon which the prose-
cution built its case. Unfortunately for the defendants 
in the present case, there is only one real witness who 
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observed the criminals and physical and scientific evi-
dence is entirely lacking. Instead, the case against 
defendants turns upon the eye-witness identification by 
the victim, Gaydra Jackman. 
Yet this identification suffers not only from the 
inherent Jifficulty of all eye-witness identifications of 
unfamiliar persons but is further weakened by the 
following facts, (I) The suggestiveness of the lineup, 
(2) The fact that Gaydra has difficulty seeing objects 
further than four feet away without her glasses and 
was not wearing her glasses during the crime, ( 3) 
The witness was naturally very upset and alarmed 
during the crime, ( 4) The witness admittedly had 
difficulty identifying defendant Ervin at the lineup, 
and ( 5) the witness' tentative identification at the 
lineup was improperly and suggestively reinforced by 
the unilateral deposition taken under oath in the court-
room by the district attorney without notice to defend-
ants or their attorney on the afternoon in which de-
fendants were arraigned. 
POINT IV 
THE IMPROPER AND SUGGESTIVE 
:MANNER IN WHICH THE LINEUP 'VAS 
CONDUCTED PREJUDICED THE RIGHTS 
OF DEFENDANTS TO A FAIR TRIAL BY 
TAINTING THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICA-
TION OF THE DEFENDANTS BY THE VIC-
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TI.M AND RENDERING THAT IDENTIFI-
CATION UNRELIABLE. 
In dealing with the problem of identification in the 
courtroom, two eminent British legal scholars have 
made the point that the question at trial asking a wit-
ness if he can identify the defendant is "of such trifling 
probative force that it ought not to be asked, except 
in the context of three other questions." These ques-
tions they urge are: 
"When and in what circumstances did the wit-
ness first recognize the defendant as the man? 
Did he have any difficulty in recognizing him? 
And by what marks did he recognize him.?" 
Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Pa-
rades, 1963 Criminal Law Review, 479, 480. 
'\Te submit that the positive in-court identification 
of the defendants by the victim is indeed of little pro-
bative value apart from the answers about prior identi-
fication. We submit further that though there are gaps 
and inadequacies in the record resulting from the denial 
of counsel at the lineup in violation of the requirement 
of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 Sup. Ct. 
1926, 18 L.Ed. 2d 149 ( 1967), there is enough in 
the record to show that the courtroom identification 
was the result of an improper lineup and improper and 
suggestive practices which followed thereafter. 'Ve ask 
this court to rule, as the California Supreme Court has 
rule in People v .Car1uoe, 65 Cal. Rep. 336, 339, 436 
P.2d 336, 339 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1968): 
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"That th~ lineu~ was unnecessarily suggestive 
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identifi-
ca~ion, and that its grossly unfair makeup de-
prived defendant to due process of law." 
Indeed what the California Supreme Court ruled 
in Carusoe applies even more strongly to this case. 
There the court noted that the other participants in 
the lineup did not physically resemble defendant. "They 
were not his size, not one had his dark complexion, and 
none had dark wavy hair." 65 Cal. Rep. 339. In the 
present case only two participants in the lineup other 
than defendants, were even of the same race as the 
defendants. One of these Negroes was completely, even 
startingly, bald and the other, though about the same 
height as defendant Ervin, was considerably more 
heavily built and had a distinctively flattened nose that 
the witness could remember several months after the 
lineup. Given these facts it is easy to conclude that 
defendants could well have been selected by the process 
of elimination as the only persons in the lineup who 
could be said by the witness as possibly resembling the 
men who committed the crimes. As the Supreme Court 
of the United States made clear in United States v. 
JVade, supra, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 
Sup. Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) and Stovall 
·v. Deno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 Sup. Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 
1199 (1967), supra, unfair suggestive and improper 
lineups are inseparably related to the later identifi· 
cation of defendants in the course of trial. Here, as in 
the Carusoe case, "The defendants' counsel could not 
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free the defense from the taint of the improper lineup, 
and his client's destiny was in a real sense, sealed by 
the time the trial commenced." People v. Carusoc, 
supra at 65 Cal. Rep. 341. 
POINT V 
IT WAS A PREJUDICIALLY IMPROPER 
AND UNFAIR TACTIC FOR THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY TO TAKE A SWORN UNILAT-
ERAL DEPOSITION OF THE VICTIM IN 
THE COURTROOM WITHOUT NOTICE TO 
DEFENDANTS OR THEIR ATTORNEY AND 
WITHOUT THE DEFENDANTS, THEIR AT-
TORNEY, OR THE JUDGE BEING PRES-
ENT, WHERE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
USED THE DEPOSITION PROCEDURE TO 
SHAPE, INFLUENCE, AND SUGGEST THE 
WITNESS' TESTIMONY BY LEADING AND 
REPETITIVE QUESTIONS. 
Despite the fact that the witness admitted to having 
some difficulty in picking defendant Ervin out of the 
lineup; despite th fact that the affidavit of the County 
Attorney who was present at the lineup shows that 
the witness was not prepared to identify Ervin as her 
assailant immediately following the lineup, the witness 
at the trial testified that she was certain defendant 
Ervin was the assailant and that she would never for-
get him. The positiveness of the witness' testimony at 
trial resulted in large measure from the prosecution's 
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improper and suggestive use of deposition procedures 
to shape and influence the witness' testimony. Speci-
fically, on the very afternoon on which defendants 
were arraigned, the district attorney caused the witness 
Gaydra Jackman to attend and submit to a deposition 
taken under oath in the courtroom in which the case 
was to be tried, without the presence of a judge and 
without notice to or presence of defendants or their 
attorney. This unilateral deposition procedure is not 
authorized or sanctioned by the Utah Code of Criminal 
Procedure and is completely novel and improper. In-
deed express provision is made for the taking of a 
witness' testimony by U.C.A. 77-15-31, but this sec-
tion expressly requires notice to the defendant and 
further requires that the testimony be taken before the 
magistrate having jurisdiction of the charge. 
At the unilateral deposition the district attorney 
repeated and repeated leading and suggestive questions 
which could have had no purpose and no effect other 
than to shape and suggest the testimony of the witness. 
Again and again, the district attorney hammered home 
by leading and suggestive questions that the witness 
could identify and would never forget the defendants 
as the men who committed the crimes. The transcript 
of the depositoin shows that no less than a dozen times, 
on page 8, twice on page 15, on page 20, on page 32, 
twice on page 44, three times on page 45, on page 48 
and on page 49, the district attorney kept hammering 
home the point through his leading questions that the 
witness was sure she could identify defendants. 'Vhile 
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there is certainly nothing wrong with an attorney dis-
cussing the case with a witness and going over the wit-
ness' testimony in preparation for trial, there are and 
must be reasonable limits on how far an attorney may 
fairly go. In this case those limits were exceeded. They 
were exceeded because the questions took place in a 
formal proceeding, under oath and in the courtroom, 
conducted as if it were part of the official proceedings 
except for the absence of the judge, the defendants 
and their attorney and except for the leading and sug-
gestive nature of the questions. The very formality 
with which the deposition was conducted had a ten-
dency to fix and shape the witness' testimony at trial. 
Given the nature of the deposition and the manner 
in which it was conducted, it is not surprising at all 
that despite her initial difficulty in identifying def end-
ant Ervin at the lineup shortly after the crime was 
committed, she was definite in her identification at 
trial and testified at page 60 of the trial transcript and 
at page 89 of the trial transcript, the answer to the 
question so carefully suggested and so repeatedly ham-
mered home by the prosecutor in the course of the 
unilateral deposition, that she would never forget the 
defendants. Given the effect of this novel and unauthor-
ized procedure on the witness' testimony, defendants 
were denied their right to a meaningful and effective 
cross-examination and confrontation of the key prose-
cution witness. Thus, in and of itself, the improper 
deposition procedure was prejudicial error. 
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POINT VI 
THE DEF'ENDANTS WERE PREJU-
DICED BY THE ERRONEOUS AND IM-
PROPER DENIAL OF COUNSEL AT THE 
LINEUP, A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE PRO-
CEEDINGS AGAINST DEFENDANTS. BY 
REASON OF THE DENIAL O:F COUNSEL AT 
THE LINEUP, TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL 
WAS HAMPERED AND PRECLUDED FROl\I 
SHOWING THE VICTIJ\-I'S FAIL URE TO 
MAKE A POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION AT 
OR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE 
LINEUP. 
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 Sup. 
Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 149 ( 1967), and Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia, 388 U.S. 263, 87 Sup. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 
1178 (1967), the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that a lineup at which a defendant is presented 
for identification to witnesses of a crime is a critical 
stage of the proceedings at which a defendant is en-
titled to the presence of counsel. The court expressly 
ruled in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 Sup. Ct. 
1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967), decided the same day 
as United States v. Wade, supra, that all lineups con-
ducted after June 12, 1967, the date of the Wade, Gil-
bert and Stovall decisions must comply with the require-
ments of Wade and Gilbert. These requirements are 
stated in United States v. Wade: 
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" ( B) oth Wade and his counsel should have 
be~n notified of the impending lineup and coun-
sels presence should have been a requisite to 
conduct of the lineup, absent an intelligent wai-
ver. See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506." 
The record in this case makes clear that the stand-
ards of Wade were not met. Indeed, at the hearing on 
defendants' motion f~r a new trial, it was established 
by defense counsel that defendants were not informed 
of their right to the presence of counsel at the lineup 
and, not having been so informed, could not intelli-
gently waive that right. While there was testimony 
that a lawyer may have been informed that a lineup 
would be held in the future, that lawyer testified that 
he did not regard himself as representing the defend-
ants and thus did not take any action in relation to 
such advice. Indeed, it is clear that the trial judge's 
decision denying the motion for new trial was erro-
neously based upon a misreading of the requirements 
of the Wade rule. As the trial judge stated at the 
hearing in the motion, at page 42: 
"What your cases say, if I understand them 
correctly is that such viewing or lineup must be 
conducted properly, and that's the purpose for 
having an attorney there." 
As the Wade case makes clear, the major purpose 
for requiring an attorney at the lineup is not just to 
assure that the lineup is fairly conducted but to permit 
effective confrontation and cross examination at the 
trial as to how the lineup was conducted and whether 
and how the witness was able to identify the suspects. 
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Indeed, the instant case is a clear example of the preju-
dicial results of denying counsel at the lineup. Though 
defense counsel sought to challenge the lineup identifi-
cation by questioning the witness about it, he was un-
able to develop the facts or show more than the fact 
that the witness had trouble in identifying the defendant 
Ervin until he put on his glasses. 
The error resulting from the failure to comply with 
the rule of United States v. Wade was not waived either 
by defendant's failure to demand the presence of counsel 
at the lineup or by the defense failure to object to the 
in-court identification at trial. 
It is clear that there can be no waiver of important 
constitutional rights by mere default, in the absence 
of knowledge of those rights for a waiver is "an inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right 
or privilege," Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 
58 Sup. Ct. 1019 ,1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); Carnley 
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 Sup. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 
2d 70 ( 1962). Since defendants were not informed of 
their rights to have counsel present at the lineup they 
cannot intelligently have waived such right. 
The Miranda warning adverted to by the trial 
judge in stating his denial of the motion for new trial 
is merely a warning relating to interrogations and ques-
tioning. Even an astute lawyer could not be expected 
to know from the Miranda warning that a defendant 
is entitled to the presence of counsel during a lineup. 
Certainly laymen would have no such knowledge. 
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As to the failure to object during the trial itself, 
certainly it is clear that defense counsel sought to raise 
the issue of the appropriateness of the lineup. Indeed, 
it must be noticed that in the Wade case itself, the issue 
was raised by a motion for a judgment of acquittal or 
alternatively to strike the courtroom identification at 
the close of the testimony of the case. In any event 
since the violation of the Wade rule was so prejudicial 
and so significant in the light of the total evidence 
and posture in this case, this court should not permit 
this conviction to stand despite the error, merely be-
cause of defense counsel's failure to make a motion to 
strike the in-court identification testimony. C.f. Henr;lj 
v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed. 
2d 408 (1965). 
While in Simmons v. United States, .... U.S .... ., 
89 Sup. Ct. 967, .... L. Ed. 2d .... , (1968), the Court 
ruled that when tested by the totality of the surround-
ing circumstances test of Stovall v. Denno, supra, a pre-
W ade identification from photographs was not so im-
proper under the circumstances as to require reversal, 
it is clear that the Court was limiting its ruling to extra-
judicial identifications by photograph. So too, Biggers 
v. Tennessee, .... U.S .... ., 89 Sup. Ct. 979, .... L. Ed. 
2d ... ., ( 1968) , in which the Court sustained a pre-Wade 
identification by an equally divided court, does not 
affect the rule of Wade as applied to lineups and other 
viewings of defendants occurring after the date of the 
Wade decision. 
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It should be noted that the present case which turns 
upon the applicability of the rule of United States v. 
Wade, supra, to lineups conducted after June 12, 1967, 
is distinguishable from the situations presented to this 
court in State v. Workman, ____ Utah 2d .... , 435 P. 2d 
919 ( 1968); Nielsen v. 11urner, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 435 P. 
2d 921 ( 1968) ; and Dyett v. Turner, ____ Utah 2d .... , 
---- P. 2d .... , (1968). In those cases this court ruled 
that newly fashioned federal constitutional rulings did 
not apply retroactively to practices and procedures 
which had occurred before the date of the rulings. In 
Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 388 U.S.: 
"'Ve hold that Wade and Gilbert affect only 
those cases and all future cases which involve 
confrontation~ for identification purposes con-
ducted in the absence of counsel after this date." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In numerous cases decided since Wade and Stovall 
state and federal courts have recognized and stated 
that lineups conducted after June 12, 1967, must be 
conducted in accordance with the Wade rule. 
The present case is a striking example of the reason 
for the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. 
TVade, supra. For here there is a clear and striking 
example of just the kind of unfairness the Supreme 
Court was seeking to prevent. Not only was the lineup 
unduly suggestive and unfair but, unknown to trial 
defense counsel until after the trial the chief prosecu-
tion witness failed to make a positive identification of 
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the defendant Ervin. Yet when cross examined about 
her identification at the lineup the witness unwittingly 
gaye the impression that she had made a positive identi-
fication of Ervin at the lineup after he put on dark 
glasses (Tr. 7 4). In fact she did not make a positive 
identification at the lineup and the time when she saw 
him in dark glasses was long after the lineup. Yet this 
erroneous impression was not corrected by the district 
attorney and the defense counsel was not aware at the 
time that the impression was erroneous. 
POINT VII 
IT 'VAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO AD-
MIT THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT ANDREW BY THE WIT-
NESS DAN HATCH WARNER SINCE HIS 
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL WAS OBTAINED 
BY A SHOCKING AND FLAGRANT VIOLA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF THE DEFENDANTS IN CIR CUM-
STANCES TENDING TO MAKE SUCH TES-
TIMONY INHERENTLY UNRELIABLE. 
We have urged above that the identification testi-
mony of the victim, Gaydra .Jackman, was tainted by 
the failure to comply with the requirements of United 
States v. Wade, supra, applicable to all lineups con-
ducted after June 12, 1967. What we have urged above 
applied with even greater force to the testimony of the 
witness Dan Hatch 'Varner. 'Vhile the testimony of 
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this witness tended to be merely corroborative, the vi0. 
~ation of the Wade rule was even more flagrant and 
improper. 
Dan Hatch Warner testified at trial that he ob-
served the defendant Carl Archie Andrew walking 
around outside the Jackman home, the scene of the 
crime, at about the time the crime was alleged to have 
occurred. This testimony tended to corroborate the 
testimony of the victim and was certainly prejudicial 
to defendants. While the witness testified that he wasn't 
positive in his identification, he did answer yes to the 
question, "With respect to the man you saw at ... the 
.Jackman residence on or about the 26th day of June, 
1967, do you recognize one of these men as being that 
man?" 
This testimony by witness Warner was obtained 
by a direct, blatant, and grossly improper violation of 
the rule of United States v. Wade, supra, reinforced by 
an improper and suggestive unilateral deposition ob· 
tained by the district attorney on August 15, 1967. 
On August 15, 1967, the date of arraignment on 
the information, the district attorney had the witness, 
Mr. 'Varner, attend the court and observe defendants 
under circumstances extremely suggestive that they 
were the ones who had committed the crime. Later oil 
the same day, without notice to defendants or their 
counsel, the district attorney conducted a unilateral 
deposition in the district courtroom with the witness 
under oath in the presence of the sheriff, the county 
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attorney, and a court reporter - in the presence of 
everyone but those persons whom common decency and 
the basic standards of American law would suggest 
ought to be present-the defendants and their attorney. 
The witness was sworn and then by leading and 
suggestive questions, led to state that he could identify 
one of the defendants. 
Given the fact that the witness' te~timony itself 
shows he had only a momentary observation of the man 
he identified as defendant Andrew and did not even 
see the man's face, and did not identify him until after 
he saw him in court as a defendant at the arraignment, 
the manner in which this identification was made and 
the suggestive deposition in which it was reinforced 
made the admission of Warner's testimony at trial 
a violation of due process of law, under the rule of 
United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and 
Stovall v. Denno. Since the testimony of the witness, 
'i\T arner was the only significant corroboration of the 
identification by the victim, its admission was preju-
dicial error as well as a violation of due process of law. 
For as the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
stated in Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F. 2d 199, 202 (1966): 
"A state may not rely in a criminal prosecu-
tion ... on an identification secured by a process 
in which the search for truth is made secondary 
to the question for conviction." 
The present case demonstrates that, when the search 
for truth is subordinated to the quest for conviction, 
injustice may result. 
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POINT VIII 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHAT. 
EVER, UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD 
HA VE FOUND DEFENDANT ANDREW TO 
BE GUILTY AS AN ACCESSORY. 
While we urge that the record demonstrates thal 
the conviction of both defendants was clearly errone· 
ous, our duty to the Court and to defendants compeh 
us to urge as well, a particular ground of error on 
behalf of defendant Andrew. Specifically, even assum 
ing, contrary to the evidence, that defendant Ervll; 
was guilty, there is no evidence to support the convic· 
tion of Andrew as an accessory. U.C.A. 76-1-46 de· 
fines as accessories : 
All persons who, after full knowledge that a 
felony has been committed, conceal it from a 
magistrate, or harbor and protect the person who 
committed it . . . 
Since defendant Andrew 'vas originally charged as a 
principal, it is obvious that the accessory charge cannot 
be based upon his failure to reveal any knowledge ht 
may have had to the magistrate before whom he him 
self was charged. Thus, the only basis for the accesson 
charge woud be that he "harbored and protected" de 
fendant Ervin. But there is not a shred of evidenc1 
to show this. The record shows that Andrew was a guesi 
in the car of Ervin's mother. Can it be said that by rid 
ing in another's car back to his own home, he harbore1
1 
and protected another guest, the son of the car's owner 
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w· ould he have had to have refused to ride in the car 
and have left himself stranded far from home in a 
State where he was a stranger to avoid being an acces-
sory? Certainly, there is nothing in the record besides 
the fact that Andrew accompanied the Ervin family 
back to Wyoming, which would indicate harboring and 
protecting. Clearly, one who merely fails to make a 
citizen's arrest or report the crime to the police i!) not 
guilty as an accessory. 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
§ 99 ( d), ( e) 
CONCLUSION 
Your Amicus respectfully urges that by reason of 
the numerous and significant errors, each of which was 
prejudicial, the conviction in this case was a miscarriage 
of justice. Accordingly, we urge this Court to reverse 
the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
I. DANIEL STEW ART 
LIONEL H. FRANKEL 
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